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1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1259 
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF PHOTOGRAPHS-In a prose-
cution for fellatio,1 the people's only witness was a woman who testified 
that she had participated in the alleged activity with the defendant. Her 
testimony also verified for introduction a motion picture purporting to 
show the alleged violations. Defendant was convicted on the basis of this 
evidence. On appeal, held, reversed. A conviction cannot be sustained on 
the basis of an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony;2 and the film, al-
though properly admitted, could not supply the necessary corroboration, 
since a determination of its accuracy must rely upon the accomplice's 
l Pursuant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 288a. 
2 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1111. 
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foundation testimony. People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 
382 P.2d 591 (1963). 
The statute which was dispositive of the instant case provides a safe-
guard against convictions resting solely on an accomplice's testimony. It 
clearly does not operate to prevent an accomplice from testifying3 or 
from laying the foundation for the introduction of demonstrative evi-
dence. 4 The statute, however, provides that an accomplice's testimony is 
insufficient to support a conviction unless there is independent corrobora-
tion connecting defendant with the crime. 5 The question, therefore, was 
whether the film furnished such corroboration within the meaning of the 
statute. 
In passing on this question, the court was required to examine the 
theoretical basis on which photographs and motion pictures are admitted 
into evidence.6 This problem has been the subject of a controversy focused 
primarily upon the evidentiary value of the photograph and the criteria 
for determining admissibility. When photographs were first used as evi-
dence, they were generally admitted on the same basis as maps, diagrams, 
and models, since this afforded a convenient precedential link with prior 
decisions.7 This is now the most common practice, and a photograph is 
admitted after a foundation is established by fulfilling two requirements: 
first, a witness must demonstrate the relevance of the photograph to facts 
in issue by identifying the picture;8 and he must also verify it on the basis 
of personal knowledge as an accurate representation of those facts.9 Dean 
Wigmore argued that these requirements are indispensable10 and urged 
that a photograph should have evidentiary value only when verified by a 
witness on the basis of personal observation.11 He argued that the function 
of a photograph, like that of maps and diagrams, is to communicate to 
the trier of fact information which the verifying witness has seen; as such, 
it is merely the witness' "pictured expression" of data which he has ob-
served.12 Thus, after being admitted, a photograph would be considered 
part of the testimony of the witness who verified it.18 
However, this theory would appear to exclude, for instance, the me-
s 19 CAL. JUR. 2d Evidence § 497 (1954). 
4 People v. Santos, 134 Cal. App. 2d 738, 26 P.2d 522 (1933). 
5 People v. MacEwing, 45 Cal. 2d 218, 288 P.2d 257 (1955); People v. Wynkoop, 165 Cal. 
App. 2d 540, 331 P.2d 1040 (1958). 
6 There is no ground for distinguishing between still and motion pictures as 
evidence. People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 798a, 
at 203 (3d ed. 1940). 
7 Scorr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 601, at 474 (1942). 
s People v. Cunha, 107 Cal. App. 2d 382, 237 P.2d 12 (1951); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 181, at 387 (1954). 
o People v. Ah Lee, 164 Cal. 350, 128 Pac. 1035 (1912); McCORMICK, op. cit. supra 
note 8, § 181, at 387. 
10 W1cMoRE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790. • 
11 Compare WmMoRE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790, with id. § 793, at 186. 
12 Id. § 792, at 178. 
13 Id. § 793, at 186. 
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chanically tripped picture of a burglar taken as he entered a building or the 
blown-up crowd scene placing the defendant at the scene of the crime. 
Examples such as these have troubled the commentators, and, although 
recognizing the necessity for verification of some kind, they have receded 
from the position that the "pictured expression" theory is the only rationale 
for admission of photographs. It is argued that, although verification by an 
eyewitness provides a sufficient basis for the admission of a photograph, 
such a basis is not a sine qua non of admissibility.14 It is further urged that 
a photograph should not be limited to communicating testimony and that 
once a proper foundation is established, a photograph may stand as an 
"independent witness," having its own probative force.15 In People v. 
Doggett16 the California Court of Appeals impliedly accepted this analysis. 
That case involved the prosecution of a husband and wife for fellatio, the 
evidence against the man consisting of photographs apparently taken by 
the defendants in their apartment. Since there was no eyewitness, the 
photographs were identified by the defendants' landlord and verified by 
an expert who testified that they were not composites or "faked." It was 
held that the photographs were properly admitted, and the conviction was 
sustained. 
It was against this background that the court approached the principal 
case. Unlike the Doggett problem, the decisive question here was not the 
admissibility of photographic evidence, but its status after admission. 
Doggett was useful only in defining the relationship between the film and 
its foundation testimony. The court in the principal case pointed out that 
under the "pictured expression" theory, the film could not corroborate 
the woman's testimony, in that it would be part of her testimony. But, 
since the court approved the analysis of the Doggett case and adopted the 
"independent witness" theory, it could not base its decision on this ground. 
Instead, it pointed out that in order for any photograph to . be admitted 
into evidence it must be shown to be an accurate portrayal. In the principal 
case, the accomplices' testimony provided this basis. But this brought the 
policy of the statute into play, since the film could furnish corroboration 
only if it was assumed to be accurate, and the determination of accuracy 
relied on the accomplice's inherently suspect testimony.17 As a result, the 
conviction rested solely on the testimony of an accomplice and fell within 
the prohibition of the statute. This result is clearly required by the statute, 
for the court's logic is unassailable. The court properly pointed out that 
14 State v. Tatum, 58 Wash. 2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961); Scorr, op. cit. supra note 7, 
§ 197. 
15 Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 63 s.w. 921 (1899) (dictum); MCKELVEY, EVIDENCE 
§ 382, at 671 (5th ed. 1944). The labels "independent witness" and "pictured expression" 
have been coined by the writer for convenient references. The theories are not usually 
referred to by these names. 
10 83 Cal. App. 2d 405, 188 P .2d 792 (1948). 
17 Cf. People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, 119 Pac. 901 (1911). 
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to allow the film to furnish corroboration would be to allow the prosecu-
tion to lift itself by its bootstraps. 
Apart from the construction placed on the statute, the most provocative 
aspect of the decision was the court's approval of the "independent witness" 
theory. The basic difference between this theory and the "pictured expres-
sion" view is suggested by a closer examination of the Doggett case. Since 
the verifying testimony in Doggett dealt only with the question of whether 
the photographs had been faked, there must have been some premise to 
fill the logical gap between this testimony and the conclusion that the 
photographs portrayed events which actually occurred. This premise as-
sumes the form of, in effect, judicial notice of the reliability of the photo-
graphic process.18 Such recognition does not seem particularly surprising, 
for it is general knowledge that a camera records actual events. When such 
notice is taken, the function served by verification is to show that a photo-
graph is not faked or distorted. Verification under the "pictured expression" 
analysis seems to have a different significance, for the theory does not recog-
nize the testimonial properties of the photograph.19 It regards the photo• 
graph as merely a mode of communicating to the trier of fact what the 
verifying witness saw.20 Thus, within the framework of the "pictured ex-
pression" theory, verification is probably best seen as a method of pro-
jecting a witness' testimony in pictorial form. 
Theoretically, this difference would affect the weight which each view 
accords a photograph.21 Under the "independent witness" theory, once it 
has been clearly established that a photograph is accurate and that ac-
curacy is unchallenged, it would be conclusive as to all matters it por-
trays.22 In contrast, under the "pictured expression" theory, the weight 
attributed to a photograph would be the same as if the testimony were 
oral. As a practical matter, this seems to be unrealistic. In light of the 
widespread knowledge of the abilities of the camera, it seems quite improb-
able that a court (and especially a jury) would disregard an unimpeached 
photograph because it conflicts with oral testimony.23 Nor would it seem 
18 A large number of courts have taken such notice. E.g., Rice v. United States, 
179 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1949); State v. Mathison, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N.W. 137 (1905); 
State v. Evans, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S.W. 921 (1899). Photographs are especially reliable where 
the fact in issue is a general representation of objects and ordinary camera distortion is 
not a material consideration. See Cunningham v. Fairhaven &: W. Ry., 72 Conn. 244, 43 
Atl. 1047 (1899). 
19 See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 790. 
20 Id. § 793. 
21 Weight is usually a jury question. E.g., Wetherell v. Hollister, 73 Conn. 662, 48 Atl. 
826 (1901); Martin Parry Corp. v. Bemer, 259 Mich. 621, 244 N.W. 180 (1932). However, 
many courts in reviewing evidence on appeal have considered the weight of a photograph. 
E.g., Hartley v. A. I. Rodd Lumber Co., 282 Mich. 652, 276 N.W. 712 (1937); Mobile &: 
O.R.R. v. Bryant, 159 Miss. 528, 132 So. 539 (1931). 
22 This principle has been occasionally referred to as the "incontrovertible physical 
fact rule." See Mobile &: O.R.R. v. Bryant, supra note 21, at 537, 132 So. at 541; Sc01T, 
op. cit. supra note 7, § 607. 
23 Cf. McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 8, § 183, at 392. 
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proper that it should.24 Moreover, if a court recognizes the characteristics of 
the photograph, it should also admit into evidence a picture that is verified 
solely by an expert, as in Doggett, because such recognition is an implicit 
adoption of the "independent witness" theory. As a practical matter, it is 
unlikely that many courts would follow the "pictured expression" analysis 
very strictly, and, in fact, no case has been found in which a photograph 
was excluded after being verified solely by an expert.25 The fallacy in 
the theory lies in the assumption that a photograph is merely a means of 
communication; this seems to be contrary to fact. While the theory might 
be justified on the ground that it provides a safeguard against distorted 
and faked photography, this problem can be dealt with separately. It 
should not necessitate resort to a theory which does not take into account 
modern knowledge about the camera. 
James W. Collier 
24 See Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36 (1882); Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 
24 N.C.L. REv. 233 (1946). 
25 The instances where a party to a suit attempts to use this method of verification 
are admittedly rare; consequently, it is perhaps dangerous to generalize on the question. 
However, it would be quite inconsistent for a court to recognize that photographs are 
generally accurate and reject a photograph when an expert has shown it is not faked or 
distorted. 
